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ABSTRACT
This study was a continuance of prior research and 
theory on the nature and assessment of motivation. The 
focus was on the academic performance situation. Existing 
empirical and theoretical work was utilized to formulate a 
complex causal model which identifies constituent elements 
related to motivation and performance, and which explicates 
their respective relationships. The theoretical model was 
employed to create an operational model for measurement and 
prediction of collegiate grade performance, a cumulative 
index of performance.
Three main fields of theory and inquiry were 
incorporated in the model: Attribution theory, self-system 
theory and metacognition theory. Literature dealing with 
pertinent knowledge in these areas and their interfacings 
was discussed in the process of outlining the theoretical 
model. Measures were selected on this basis to form the 
operational model. Measures included indices of effort, 
ability, locus of control, self-esteem and study style.
Regression analyses were used to determine which 
elements were useful as collective predictors of grade-point 
average. Reliability and validity were investigated for the
IX
individual measures. Finally, the operational model was 
investigated using the LISREL-VI program.
Results indicated that some twenty-five percent of the 
variance in grade-point average was accounted for by the 
model. Most useful predictors were ability, effort and 
study methodology, respectively. Reliability and validity 
estimates were concordant with known characteristics in the 
literature.
The operational model was found to have been mismapped 
onto the theoretical model initially, with the result being 
a model which could not be analyzed by the LISREL program 
due, in part, to very poor fit with the data. After 
reformulation, without statistical aid, the model succeeded 
in accounting for about ninety-one percent of the total 
variance in the data. The fit of the model to the data was 
good.
Overall, while the model was well- specified in terms of 
internal relationships, there is need to specify additional 
parameters in future studies. Possibilities were discussed.
Results were generally encouraging, despite observable 
weaknesses. These weaknesses and means of coping with them 
were discussed. Also, this study was placed in reference to 
other research and directions for future study were
considered.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Motivation is a term which has long been theorized to 
refer to a complex construct, composed of multiple 
interrelated dimensions or sub - constructs. The various 
concepts which have been postulated to comprise this nexus 
of factors are numerous in the history of psychology. Over 
time, gradual convergences of ideas have taken place, 
drawing formerly diverse efforts at inquiry into several 
main streams of research and theory. The result has been 
clearer thinking and greater knowledge about the natures of 
these constructs and their interrelations. Meaningful 
measurement of this construct may now be within reach.
The purpose of this paper is to identify the lines of 
thought which have come together to make this possible, and 
then to propose the construction of such a measure, based on 
these origins and previous work by this author.
The origins and confluence of three major forces will 
be discussed: attribution theory, self-system theory and 
metacognition theory. The way in which the last of these 
may afford a framework for measurement will be outlined and 
connected with the model forwarded by Schmelzer (1991) . The 
rationale for this study will then be described in that 
context.
1
T h r e e  L in e s  o f  T h o u gh t an d  I n q u i r y
Early motivation theory was characterized by attempts 
to root behavior in an identifiable biological substrate.
The thinking of the time was influenced strongly by Darwin's 
(1871) formulation of instincts, and his influence is 
reflected in the works of many later theorists such as 
McDoucall, Hull, Piaget and White (Brody, 1983). In these 
and related approaches, motivation was opined to be a built- 
in property, arising from the nature of the body's hard 
wiring. Unfortunately, these theories could not fully 
address the complexity of the human condition, especially in 
the particular way we experience it. Darwin's injection of 
instincts into the human equation resulted in a diversion of 
interest away from these classic problems of goal-directed 
behavior for quite some time, especially as these problems 
pertain to humans (Russell, 1970).
M JtrJJb y jJL  qn.. _ Th go r y
Viewed retrospectively, a major cornerstone of modern 
motivation theory - which does match more amenably with our 
experience - was laid with the work of Herder (19 58) . In 
his "naive analysis of action", Heider introduced the 
concept of causal unit formation, in which the tendency to 
reduce the diversity of multitudinous stimuli leads to the 
connection of individual objects and events - a process 
called attribution. This process became central to what has
mushroomed out into the broadly influential, cognitive realm 
of modern attribution theory.
One of the most prolific disciples of attribution 
theory has been Bernard Weiner. Through a steady stream of 
theoretical and research contributions over the past two and 
a half decades (Weiner, 1979, 1980a, 1980b, 1982, 1983,
1985; Weiner & Kukla, 1970; Weiner, et al, 1971; Weiner, et 
al, 1976; Weiner, et al, 1978; Weiner, et al, 1979; Weiner, 
et al, 1982; Weiner, Graham & Chandler, 1982; Weiner &
Graham 1984; Weiner & Handel, 1985) Weiner has provided the 
massive trunk of a tree of thought and inquiry, the branches 
of which touch or include perceived competence (Harter,
1982a; Nicholls, 1984), mastery (Ames & Archer, 1988),social 
cognition (Maehr & Stallings, 1972), self-worth (Covington,
1984), self-serving attributional biases (Nicholls, 1976; 
Pyszczynski &. Greenberg, 1983; Jagacinski & Nicholls, 1990) 
and learned helplessness (Abramson, et al., 1978; Arkin & 
Baumgardner, 1985; Fincham & Cain, 1986), and which now 
anmesh closely with self-system theory, another major 
research tradition anchored by Bandura's notion of self- 
2fficacy (1974, 1977).
Weiner’s explanation of the process of attribution 
jxplicitly acknowledges two familiar concepts. The first is 
he concept of mastery, as introduced by White (1959). The 
lecond, the search for functional Links, descends from 
[eider’s early introduction of causal unit formation, and
serves the ends of mastery. The apparent ubiquitousness cf 
these concepts across time and cultures led Weiner co regard 
them as apt foundation blocks for a theory of motivation 
(Weiner, 1985).
Weiner embraced the partition of causes along the 
internal-external dimension described by Rotter (1966) but: 
pointed out that especially within internal factors, some 
may be considered as either stable or variable in nature 
(Weiner, et al 1971; Weiner 1985). Fov instance, ability 
may be conceived of as a stable inherent factor or, if 
learning is possible, as a varying inherent factor; effort 
may be considered as a momentary state or as a trait, like 
"lazy". He proposed a second "stability" dimension to 
address such possibilities.
The addition of this distinction was not wholly 
sufficient however, since internal causes could also vary in 
terms of their accessibility to volitional control.
Laziness is considered to be more under volitional control 
than, say, math ability, for example. Hence, a third 
property of causes was added to the attribution model, 
controllability (Weiner,1979). Within this three- 
dimensional taxonomy then, were three causal properties: 
locus, stability and controllability. These three 
dimensions have been found to be reliable, general across 
situations, and meaningful (Weiner, 1985).
Self- system Theory
William James (1890/1963) was one of the first in 
psychology to discuss self-concept, or more specifically, 
the sense of self. He distinguished between the "self as 
knower" and the "self as object," with the latter defined as 
an individual's seif-concept. However, research along these 
lines dwindled when the behavioral paradigm dominated in 
psychology, until interest resurged in the 1970's - partly 
kindled by the social learning theory of Bandura (1974,
1977, 1978).
Within the context of the reciprocal determinism of 
interacting cognitive, behavioral and environmental factors 
Bandura sees the self-system as referring to primarily 
cognitive structures that regulate behavior (Kail & Lindzey,
1985). A key component of the self system is self-efficacy, 
which is defined as " People's judgements of their 
capabilities to organize and execute courses of action 
required to attain designated types of performance (Bandura, 
1986, p. 391). The motivational quality arises from the 
resultant ability to anticipate future reinforcement on this 
basis. Since the introduction of this concept in his 
seminal article (Bandura, 1974), much research has 
articulated and extended the role of self-efficacy as an 
underlying mechanism in the genera'lizat .on, maintenance and 
change of behavior (Schunk, 1991).
Self-efficacy theory postulates that people gather 
information from numerous sources to appraise efficacy 
{Bandura., 1986). From within this perspective, attributions 
constitute one of myriad types of data which contribute to 
individuals' efficacy appraisals (Schunk, 1991). Naturally, 
personal experience with one's own performance outcomes 
provides the most direct means of assessing efficacy. 
However, both actual and observed success may improve the 
sense of efficacy and failure can diminish it. Yet, if a 
strong sense of efficacy is established, failure may not 
have great impact (Bandura, 1986). This is because multiple 
cognitive appraisals mediate efficacy evaluation. Efficacy 
appraisal is said to be an inferential process in which 
persons assess the combined, reciprocal contributions of 
personal and situational factors such as their perceived 
ability, task difficulty, effort expenditure, 
success/failure configurations, perceived similarity to 
models, assistance received and persuader credibility 
(S< k, 1989).
Attribution and Self-efficacy
Just as Bandura said about self-efficacy (Bandura,
1986), Weiner (1985) - having given the three-dimensional
foundation of attributions, and in turn, focusing on 
achievement motivation - also proposed that causal 
attributions in this realm are intimately dependent upon 
perceptions of success and failure. This interface between
the two approaches has been proceeding extensively since 
their introductions - representing as they do two somewhat 
differing levels of functional analysis in the same domain.
This difference, as well as the ease of the interface, 
is exemplified in Weiner's (1985) discussion of che emotion 
pride, in which pride, or positive self-esteem, is 
postulated to result from attributing positive outcomes to 
the self, and negative self-esteem is fostered when negative 
results are attributed in this same way (Stipek, 1983; 
Weiner, et al., 1978). Pride and self-esteem are said to be 
self-reflective emotions, linked to the locus of causality 
(Weiner, 1985) of the attributed event.
Further, Weiner (1985) and Harvey and Weary (1981) 
point to a vast attributional literature which documents 
what is referred to as self-serving attributional bias (also 
called hedonic bias), or the tendency to ascribe success to 
internal causes and failure to external causes.
The self-serving attributional bias literature is a 
synergistic fusion of cognitive-attributional and self- 
theory approaches, showing pretty clearly how the two levels 
of analysis interlock. Concepts such as "self-concept, ' 
"self-worth," "mastery" and "perceived competence" - which 
had become central to formulations descending from social 
learning theory (Bandura, 1977), self-perception theory 
(Bern, 1972), social cognition (Lepper & Greene, 1978) and 
theories of competence and intrinsic motivation (de Charms,
1963; Deci, 1975; Harter, 1978, 1981a, 1981b; White, 1959, 
1963) - figure prominently alongside the various cognitive
attributional constructs. Reviews in this area (Bradley, 
1978; Zuckerman, 1979) indicate that certain self-esteem 
protecting strategies are pervasive, especially the tendency 
to deny blame for failure. Numerous theorists have even 
postulated anticipatory maneuvers which shield the self- 
system, or elements in it, from unfavorable feedback in the 
face of anticipated failure (Nicholls, 1976; Berglas & Jones 
1978; Covington & Omelich, 1981; Snyder & Wicklund, 1981; 
Pyszczinski & Greenberg, 1983; Jagacinski & Nicholls, 1990).
Since characteristically, constructs such as self- 
concept and self-esteem (see Wigfield & Karpathian, 1991, 
for a detailed discussion of these concepts) are vaguely 
defined at the basic conceptual level and therefore do not 
point to any clear operational definitions (Harter, 1982a), 
instruments designed to tap these self - evaluative processes 
are often seriously affected (Robinson & Shaver, 1973;
Wylie, 1974, 1979). Although we know that concepts like 
self-efficacy can predict academic performance to some 
extent, problems with definition and measurement make it 
difficult to incorporate previous measures of such 
constructs into a generalized academic motivational 
assessment battery without a clear rationale regarding their 
fit with other motivational constructs.
Fortunately, recent developments in the field of 
metacognition may provide the missing link; in particular, 
the work of Borkowski, et al. (1990). One of the real 
values of this reference, in the perception of this author, 
is the way in which it recognizes the differing levels of 
analytic applicability of three approaches and ties them 
together to form a more meaningful, useful whole by 
explicating their interrelatedness. The following 
discussion briefly outlines its basic ideas.
Theory in Metacoanition, Attribution & Self-esteem
The essential premise, or theme followed by Borkowski, 
et al. (1990), is that while motivational states often guide
and impel human behavior, "they also play more subtle roles 
in determining the actual strength, shape, or functioning of 
cognitive processes." They explicitly advance the position 
that metacognition theory is especially well suited for 
understanding more about the interface of motivation, 
attitudes and cognition. Their basic stance is that actions 
based on the knowledge and implementation of strategies 
directly influence self-concept, attributions about personal 
control, and attitudes about learning. These "personal - 
motivational states" influence metacognitive development and 
the likelihood of strategy generalization (Borkowski, et 
al., 1987; Oka & Paris, 1987).
Metacognition may be referred to as self-understanding 
of the nature and function of mental processes. Borkowski,
et al. (1990) conceptualize metacognition in terms of three
interactive, mutually-related components identified earlier 
(Pressley, et al., 1985): Specific Strategy Knowledge, 
General Strategy Knowledge and Metamemory Acquisition 
Processes (MAPs). General Strategy Knowledge was expanded 
to include motivational properties that seem relevant to 
academic performance (Borkowski, et al., 1990). The 
following descriptions of each are excerpts from that 
article (pp. 55-58).
Specific Strategy Knowledge. At the core of the 
model is specific strategy knowledge. Each strat­
egy has a base of knowledge associated with it.
The child with well-developed specific strategy 
knowledge knows the task demands that dictate the 
use of particular strategies but not others, when 
to use these strategies, and how to apply them 
efficiently with the least effort. From this per­
spective, the appearance of a strategy on a trans­
fer test suggests that the learner possessed suf­
ficient information about its attributes so that 
the new task was recognized as solvable through 
the application of one of several available 
strategies (Borkowski, 1985).
Metamemory Acquisition Procedures. Metamemory 
acquisition procedures (MAPs) are strategies that 
operate on strategies. Thus, learners can compare 
strategies with one another or conduct personal
experiments, extending strategies that they know 
to new situations. MAPs allow the on-line regula­
tion and monitoring of strategies, so that effec­
tive and efficient strategies are maintained but 
strategies detected as ineffective and inefficient 
are discarded......Metacognitive acquisition procedures boil down 
to self-experimentation. As such, they represent 
extremely sophisticated approaches to deliberate 
reflection about strategies.
General Strategy Knowledge and Attributional 
Beliefs. One form cf general strategy knowledge 
is the child's understanding that effort is 
required to apply strategies, with an eventual 
payoff in improved performance. Another is the 
general understanding that well-chosen strategies 
produce efficient performance. A third form is 
understanding that rudimentary strategic plans 
should be made before trying to carry out a task, 
with the additional recognition that the plan may 
need to be modified as the task proceeds. These 
aspects of general strategy knowledge increase the 
likelihood that an individual will search for, 
modify, and apply appropriate strategies.
(Clifford, 1984).
General knowledge about the efficacy of strategies can 
be facilitated in various ways (Borkowski & Cavanaugh, 1979; 
Borkowski & Krause, 1985; Borkowski, Levers & Gruenenfelder, 
1976; Kennedy and Miller, 1976; Lawson & Fuelop, 1980), and 
has been conceptualized as having motivational qualities 
(Borkowski & Krause, 1985) . The motivational correlates of 
metacognition include positive self-esteem, an internal 
locus of control and constructive attributional beliefs 
about the causes of success and failure (Borkowski, et al., 
1990). Borkowski, et al. (1990), believe that general 
strategy knowledge, and its associated motivational factors, 
are bidirectionally related and mutually influential.
Further, research indicates that the self-system - 
including constructs like self-esteem, attributions, self- 
efficacy and achievement motivation - is an interdependent 
nexus, supporting rnetacognitive functions and academic 
performance alike (McCombs, 1986). It is known, for 
example, that the accretion of attributions is linked to
attitudes about self-efficacy (Eccles, 1983; Harter, 1982a) 
and self-esteem (Watkins, 1984; Weiner, 1985). Self-esteem 
and related self-system constructs in turn predict 
achievement (Bandura, 1986; Calsey & Kenney, 1977; Marsh, 
1986; Oka & Paris, 1987; Purkey, 1970).
This being the case, and since metacognition seems to 
be a useful and powerful explanator of the self - system1s 
influence through skilled learning (Borkowski, et al.,
1990) , the overall model is useful in describing how 
affective, motivational an attributional constructs 
converge to affect academic performance. "From the 
perspective of the metacognitive model, children who feel 
good about themsel s and their ability - those who are 
intrinsically motivated to learn and who have effort - related 
attributions - are more likely to believe in strategic 
behavior a i to develop complete, mature strategy knowledge 
(Borkow i, et al., 1990)"
Borkowski, et al. (1990), believe that high degrees of
academic attainment are typified by personal conditions of 
high self-esteem, intrinsic motivation and effort - related 
attributional beliefs. These characteristics combine with 
perceptual efficiency and sharper specific strategy know­
ledge to promote higher-order MAPs, the establishment of 
whiten is expected to set gifted students apart from average 
students (Borkowski & Kurtz, 1987) . Successful students 
believe that effort is central to their successes. On the
other hand, children who have inaccurate, immature beliefs 
about success and failure (such as attributing good outcomes 
to luck and failure to ineptitude) may tend to show deficits 
of strategic behavior in the face of difficulty (Dweck,
1987; Kurtz & Borkowski, 1984). These students often fail 
to develop functional 3elf-systems that would facilitate 
their progress through school (Borkowski et al., 1990) and 
which, along with a lack of corresponding metacognitive 
development, is likely to result in poor performance.
The Metacognition Model & Measurement of Motivation
Based on the assumptions that the motivational 
correlates of metacognition include positive self-esteem, an 
internal locus of control and constructive attributional 
beliefs about the causes of success and failure, and that 
high degrees of academic attainment are typified by personal 
conditions of high self-esteem, intrinsic motivation and 
effort - related attributional beliefs (Borkowski, et al.,
1990), this author proposes that an adequate test instrument 
based on these constructs is feasible. This position is 
founded in part on the author's retrospective reanalysis of 
a previous work of his own on the Collegiate Academic 
Motivation Test (Schmelzer, 1991), which suggests the 
possible presence of self-esteem, locus of control, and 
effort attribution dimensions infused in its factor-based 
scales. A discussion of the background and nature of this
instrument follows.
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Prediction of Performance -
The Collegiate Academic Motivation Scale
Despite its abundance in theories interrelating 
motivation with thought, learning and performance (Bower & 
Hilgard, 1975), the history of psychology is rather less 
than replete with reports of practical measures by which to 
quantify it.
While this is certainly true of the field in general, 
it is eminently clear in the subarea which addresses 
academic performance. In an extensive search of the 
literature relating motivation and academic achievement, 
this author found no clear precedent to his effort 
(Schmelzer, 1991) to develop a measure which could be used 
in conjunction with intelligence estimates to predict school, 
performance. Perhaps the nearest approximations to this 
were the works of Cattell's research team (Barton, el al., 
1971, 1972; Cat tell, et al., 1972; Dielman, et al., 1970, 
1971; Schuerger, et al., 1970), using certain elements of 
the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (Cattell, et; 
al, 1970) to predict school coursework performance. This 
small body of research indicated that large portions of the 
variance in school performance could be accounted for by 
motivational factors and sometimes these portions were 
greater than could be accounted for by intelligence measures 
alone. Two reports (Barton, et al., 1972; Dielman, et al., 
1972) claim portions of variance accounted for by motivation
15
ranging from fifteen to forty-three percent (depending on 
tne grade level of the subjects), suggesting that the 
utility of motivational measures could be great.
The Schmelzer (1991) prospective study was motivated in 
part by these promising results, as well as by a belief in 
the need for a sound but tractable measure of this 
construct, with which to more fully address matters of 
predicting and evaluating academic performance. Having no 
clear precedent in the literatuie, and not having found the 
Borkowski, et al, article (1990) cited extensively above, 
the measure was constructed from an atheoretical stance, 
using a large pool of rationally-derived items subjected to 
empirical evaluation. The items were initially constructed 
to reflect the content of significant past and current 
theoretical schools of thought in the area of motivation - 
especially in the realm of attribution theory, including the 
works of Heider (1958), Weiner (Weiner & Kukla, 1970;
Weiner, et al., 1971; Weiner, 1985), Rotter (1966), Nicholls 
(1976, 1984; Jagacinski & Nicholls, 1990) and numerous 
related others (Kaehr & Stallings, 1972; Bandura, 1974,
1977; Ca'lder & Staw, 1985; Deci . 1975; Kruglanski, 1975; 
Abramson, et al., 1978; Harter, 1981, 1982; Pyszczynski & 
Greenberg, 198.'; Covington, 1984 ; Arkin & Baumgardner, 1985; 
Fincham «; Cain, 1986; Ames & Archer, 1988; Pintrich &
DeGroot, 1990) .
Scales were then composed through empirical selection, 
v^a factor analyses, with the exclusion of items having 
factor loadings of less than .30. This resulted in five 
factor-based subscales. Internal consistencies for the 
subscales ranged from .07 to .81. Three of the five scales 
were useful predictors of the criterion measure, grade point 
average, accounting for about thirteen percent of the 
variance. Since the Cattell team’s findings (Barton, et 
al., 1971, 1972; Cattell, et al., 1972; Dielman, et al.,
1970. 1971; Schuerger, et al., 1970} related motivation to
grade performance in specific subjects, and the Schmelzer 
study used more generalized indices, the results appeared to 
be fairly encouraging. Unfortunately, observed relation­
ships among other marker elements in the broader performance 
model in which the Schmelzer measure was imbedded were weak, 
thus making conclusive evaluations of the results untenable.
Nonetheless, reexamination of the three useful 
subscales does reveal some interesting directions to proceed 
in. Table 1 shows the item composition, factor loadings and 
internal consistencies of the three latent factors upon 
which the subscales were based, and is excerpted from the 
reported results (Schmelzer, 1991, pp. 17-18).
The first factor appeared to address the topic of 
performance attributions, in a way that looks much like 
Weiner's (1985) variability - stability dimension. This 
factor accounted for 16.6% of the common variance of items
or Schmelzer's Collegiate Academic Motivation Test. Its 
equal - length Spearman-Brown estimate of factor reliability 
was given as .60. Its internal consistency, however, was 
somewhat lower (alpha-.42; see Table 1). The factor-based 
subscale was correlated fairly strongly with each of the 
others, ranging from .52 to .72 (see Table 2), suggesting 
the possibility of similar content. It included 24 items 
with factor loadings ranging from .32 to .61 (see Table 1).
High scores on this scale seemed to suggest individuals 
who attribute successes to personal factors rather than 
outside forces; low scorers feel helpless and may attribute 
successes to features such as luck. The items with highest 
loadings were, "I feel helpless at school," "I won't be able 
to raise my grades," and "I feel capable enough in school." 
However, with a brief perusal of the other items in the sub- 
scale, the reader can readily identify aspects of each of 
the major schools of thought discussed earlier. Neither the 
scale nor the items themselves appear to be unidimensional. 
Further, the constructs involved have already been acknowl­
edged above as interrelated, conceptually nondiscrete.
This lack of conceptual discreteness in the items was 
observed by Schmelzer during the construction of the 
instrument, but was not addressed in a systematic way, 
partly due to the assumption that the analytic procedures 
employed would produce a clearer organization of content in 
the results. As can be seen here, and in examination of the
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Table 1
The Collegiate Academic Motivation Test : 
Factor Loadings and Internal Reliabilities*
Factors Factor Alpha 
Loadings
FACTOR 1 .42
I feel helpless at school. .61
I won't be able to raise my grades. .54
I feel capable enough in school. -.54
I feel bad about myself at school. .52
If I am having trouble, I give up. .52
I expect to fail in things I do at school. .51
I fail because I don't have enough ability. .49
I reduce my effort on something if I think .48
I may fail at it.
If I think I may fail, I try harder. -.48
The causes of my academic troubles are .47
permanent.
I have bad days at school. .43
I feel good about myself at school. -.42
I am not in good health at school. .42
In the past, when I have succeeded, it was .41 
because I got lucky, rather than because I 
meant to succeed.
On an important task, if I think it is too .41 
hard, I will spend less energy on it.
I feel smart during school. -.40
I encounter tasks at school that seem .39
impossible.
In the past, when I have succeeded, it was -.38 
because I meant to, and not because of good 
luck.
I wish I could disappear when I'm at school. .36 
I expect successes at school. -.38
I intend to succeed and do succeed. -.41
If I am having trouble, I try harder. -.36
The causes of my academic successes are not .32 
under my control.
★ Numeric labels retained from Schmelzer (1991) .
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Factors Factor Alpha 
Loadings
FACTOR 3 .81
If I think I may fail, I try harder. .39
I feel good about myself at school. .36
I feel smart during school. 30
I don ■ l . i ... . 2
I intend to do the best I can with academics. .71 
Doing well in academics is important to me. .63 
My performance in school has a strong effect .50 
on how I see myself.
I intend to get higher grades. .48
I expect successes at school. .48
I intend to succeed and do succeed. .46
If I am having trouble, I try harder. .45
Good school performance will help me get .44
ahead in life.
I want to learn. .39
I want to understand what I study. .37
Learning, in school, is useful. .32
FACTOR 4 .17
I fail because I don't have enough ability. -.32 
Good school performance will help me get .32
ahead in life.
If I am failing it is my own fault. .58
When I fail, it is because I wasn't trying .55
hard enough.
How well I do in school is in my own hands. .51
The causes of my academic troubles are under .49 
my control.
What I do determines my grades. .44
If I am failing it is not my fault. -.44
The causes of my academic successes are not -.41 
under my control.
My grades are controlled by someone else. -.35 
My failures happen due to lack of interest .31 
on my part.
other two useful scales, this did not prove to be the case. 
The reasons could be manifold; however, it seems that one 
reasonable conclusion is that the factor-analytic
approach is insufficient to sensitively address the complex, 
bidirectional interrelations of the constructs involved.
Factor 3 seemed to address achievement orientation. It 
accounted for 3.8% of the common variance. This factor's 
unequal - length Spearman - Brown estimate of factor rel ■’ ahi 1 ’ *"v 
was given as .78; its internal consistency, .81 (see Table
1). Its subscale also correlated with each of the others, 
ranging from .35 to .72 (see Table 2). It included 15 items 
with factor loadings from .30 to .71 (Table 1). The highest 
loading items included, "I intend to do the best I can with 
academics," "Doing well in academics is important to me" and 
"My performance in school has a strong effect on how I see
Table 2
Intercorrelations Among 3 CAM Test Factor-based Subscales*
Subscale 1 3 4
1 1.00
3 - .72 1.00
4 - .52 .35 1.00
* Numeric labels retained from original report (Schmelzer, 
1991) .
myself" (see Table .1) . High scores indicate a general 
devaluing of academic achievement, while low scorers are 
very achievement-oriented.
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Again, multiple constructs can be recognized within the 
scale, including achievement valuation, effort attribution, 
self system constructs and affective components.
The fourth factor was seen to address locus of 
control, especially in regard to failure. High scorers 
tended to externalize failure while low scorers made self- 
referent attributions. This factor accounted for 2.5% of 
the items' common variance. The unequal-length Spearman- 
Brown estimate of factor reliability was .23. Its internal 
consistency was similarly low (alpha=.17; see Table 1).
This factor’s subscale correlated moderately to well with 
the other two useful factors (correlations of -.52, .35).
It was composed of 11 items. Factor loadings ranged from 
.31 to .58 (Table 1). Highest loading items were, "If I am 
failing, it is my own fault," "When I fail, it is because I 
wasn't trying hard enough" and "How well I do in school is 
in my own hands" (Table 1). Just as with the other two 
scales that proved to be useful conjoint predictors, with 
the benefit of hindsight and the metacognitive theoretical 
model, multiple contributing concepts can be easily observed 
here.
The intercorrelations of these scales, as well as 
shared variances with intellective and strategy-use 
measures, suggest that part of the obscurity in the observed 
results was due to the fact that, despite efforts to the
contrary, items did not succeed in reflecting single, basic 
concepts.
It may be inferred then, that a test composed of 
unidimensional scales, for which the structure of functional 
interrelations is known or theorized a priori, would succeed 
more fully as a useful, comprehensible measure of 
motivation. The notable portion of variance accounted for 
by the CAM, despite its implementation difficulties and lack 
of conclusive results, suggests this to be a viable avenue 
of approach.
The S tudv
In light of this and the preceding discussion, this 
author proposed and undertook the construction of a 
generalized measurement battery for academic motivation, 
comprised of scales addressing locus of control, self-esteem 
and the tendency to attribute success to effort, based on 
the known relevance of these concepts to motivation and 
performance, as delineated by Borkowski, et al. (1990) . The
purpose of the test will be identical to that in Schmelzer 
(1991), which is ultimately to augment intelligence 
estimates in the prediction of academic performance. Recall 
that the motivational correlates of metacognition include 
positive self-esteem, an internal locus of control and 
constructive attributional beliefs about the causes of 
staccess and failure, and that high degrees of academic 
attainment are typified by personal conditions of high self-
esteem, intrinsic motivation and effort-related 
attributional beliefs (Borkowski, et al., 1990).
Conversely, deficits in the areas might be expected in low 
achievers. Research supports this notion as well (Carr & 
Borkowski, 1987; Clifford, 1984; Covington, 1987; Covington 
& Omelich, 1981; Diener & Dweck, 1978; Dweck, 1987; Dweck & 
Repucci, 1973; Durr & Collier, 1968; Kurtz & Borkowski,
1984; Jacobsen, Lowery & DuCette, 1986). Taken together, 
these facts provide the rationale which guided the selection 
of scales for inclusion in the proposed battery.
The procedure for accomplishing this end will call for 
a single sample, for the performance of multivariate 
regressions and establishment of a weighted formula relating 
the scales. A subsample will be recalled to assess the 
reliability of the test battery and its subscale formula.
Measures Selected as Subscales
The selection of these scales or portions of scales has 
been, as indicated, theory-driven. The choice of topical 
areas was predicated primarily on a metacognitive 
formulation of motivation (Borkowski, et al., 1990) and 
secondarily on retrospective evidence suggesting the 
viability of those constructs ( based on Schmelzer, 1991) .
In terms of the search for the scales, a priori criteria 
were generated, requiring brevity, already-known 
psychometric properties and relatively good validity. These 
criteria were applied to assure: (1) that the collective
number of predictor items did not exceed both the temporal 
and sampling scopes of the study, in terms of the number of 
subjects needed to afford sufficient statistical power in 
the subsequent analyses (use of existing extended tests of 
the identified subareas would require more than a thousand 
subjects for robust statistical results), (2) that the
latent constructs do, in fact, have some known predictive 
utility when regarded singly, and (3) that the scales do, in 
fact, represent the constructs identified, namely: locus of 
control, self-esteem and attribution of success to effort. 
Following is a discussion of the measures to be used and 
evidence supporting their selection.
Table 3
Rotter's Locus of Control Items in the Brief Scale.* *,* *
Internal Items ("Internal Control")
When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make 
them v;ork.
Getting people to do the right things depends upon 
ability; luck has nothing to do with it.
What happens to me is my own doing.
External Items ("Chance")
Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due 
to bad luck.
Getting a good job depends mainly of being in the right 
place at the right time.
Many times I feel that I have little influence over the 
things that happen to me.
*Five-point scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly 
agree (5).
**Excerpted from Lumpkin (1985).
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Locus of Control: The Abbreviated Rotter Scale 
(Lumpkin, 1985). This is a six-item rendition (Lumpkin, 
1985) of the widely-accepted, original, 23-item, forced- 
choice Rotter (1966) scale. However, instead of using three 
forced - choice pairs of questions, three "internal" items and 
three "external" items were selected (see Table 3) and 
scored on a five point Likert format suggested by Levenson 
(1974). These sets allegedly (Lumpkin, 1985) reflect both 
the "chance" and "internal" dimensions identified by 
Levenson (1974). However, there is no concensus on the 
dimensionality of locus of control (Abrahamson, et al.,
1973; Collins, 1974; Mirels, 1970; Reid & Ware, 1973).
The Lumpkin (1985) results were based on a sample of 
4,720 subjects contacted by mail. Some 3,009 usable 
responses were obtained. The Cronbach's alpha coefficient 
of internal consistency (Crcnbach, 1951) was .68, which 
reportedly compares favorably with the range of .65 to .79 
reported by Rotter (1966) and the .66 for a six-item scale 
by Bugaighis & Schumm (1983). Support for the validity of 
the measure was substantiated by replication of previously- 
known relationships between measures of locus of control and 
other concepts such as Life Satisfaction and Perceived 
Risk., among others. Lumpkin concluded that the obtained 
results indicate that the scale has predictive validity.
Self-esteem: The Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale
(Rosenberg, 1989) . This is a ten-item Guttman scale which
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is reportedly unidimensional (Rosenberg, 1989). Table 4 
contains the items on this scale. The author states its 
reproducibility to be 92 percent and its scalability to be 
72 percent. Correlations with constructs such as depression 
and ability to criticize one's self are cited to support the 
validity of the measure further. The scale has been used 
diversely and extensively over the years, gaining support of 
its validity through relationships to job-related attitudes 
(Mohan & Bali, 1988), self-evaluation (Hoelter, 1986) and 
psychopathology (Beck, 1990) .
Table 4
Items on the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale
1) On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
2) At times I think I am no good at all.
3) I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
4) I am able to do things as well as most other people.
5) I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
6) I certainly feel useless at times.
7) I feel that I am a. person of worth, at leas on an equal 
plane with others.
8) I wish I could have more respect for myself.
9) All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
10) I take a positive attitude toward myself.
Attribution of success to effort: The Insufficient 
Effort subscale of the Levels of Attribution and Change 
Scale (Norcross, et al., 1985). This subscale is part of a 
60-item instrument that assess the levels and loci of causal 
attributions about a self- selected problem. Research 
attests to the psychometric rigor of the whole scale 
(Norcross & Magletta, 1990; Norcross, et al., 1985).
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The Insufrit ient Effort Subscale (see Table 5) contains 
six items with factor loadings ranging from .54 to .81, and 
with alpha coefficients of internal consistency reported at 
.83 (Norcross & Magletta, 1990) and .92 (Norcross, et al., 
1985). Its test-retest coefficient was .84 at two weeks 
(Norcross & Magletta, 1990) . Construct validity is 
evidenced by significant relationships with constructs such 
as social desirability, external chance and external others. 
The test is scored on a five-point response format (1 = 
strongly disagree, 3 = undecided, 5 = strongly agree) and 
the lead-in can be modified to fit various problems.
Table 5
Ibg©_§_ on the Insufficient Effort Subscale of the Levels of 
Atbr.i_bu.tion and Change Scale
I tern
(My problem is partly due to:)
my lack of competence
the fact that I really don't try hard enough to 
change myself 
my lack of willpower 
the way I mess things up
the fact that I try hard enough to solve my 
problem
a simple lack of willpower on my part
The Modeled Context
The constructs underlying the three scales above have 
been described within a complex structure of bidirectionally 
interrelating concepts. Schmelzer (1991) outlined a basic
performance model involving motivation, ability, 
implementation and performance variables, as a contextual 
nest for the construction of the prototype Collegiate 
Academic Motivation Test. Figure 1 depicts directions of 
relationships posited in that model.
Figure 1. Basic Performance Model.
Using the Collegiate Academic Motivation Test, a brief 
intelligence estimate (Shipley, 1940) and an index of 
learning style (Schmeck, 1983) as operationalizations of the 
constructs, the model was subjected to evaluation via 
LISREL-VI analyses (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1983) which 
determined the extent to which the proposed relationships 
matched those existing in the data.
Results indicated that the fit of the overall model ivas 
not perfect. It left some fifteen percent cf the variance 
unexplained - indicating that one or more parameters were 
left unspecified.
In light of the model forwarded by Borkowski, et al. 
(1990), it is easy to see that part of the problem was that
most of the paths in the Schmelzer (1991) model were 
unidirectional, rather than all being bidirectional.
A second problem was that the model lacked the benefit 
of a priori distinction of metacognitive, cognitive- 
tributional and self-system variables contributing 
motivational properties to the model. The structure of the 
motivational construct and the pathways of its operational 
sub-elements were insufficiently articulated.
Along these lines, another part of the problem was that 
a few major components were missing. Specific Strategy 
Knowledge should have been included, in bidirectional 
relationship to General Strategy Knowledge and 
unidirectional relationship to strategy selection, at least. 
A cognitive appraisal structure/process should also have 
been incorporated, either implicitly or explicitly, 
mediating relationships between ability (adopting the 
"incremental" perspective of Dweck, 1987), self-efficacy, 
strategy use, and task demands.
The Schmelzer (1991) study used the Inventory of 
Learning Profiles test (ILP, Schmeck, 1983; see Appendix C 
for the test; refer to the Method section description of 
measures for details) as representing the way motivation and 
intellectual ability are channelled to produce performance. 
Schmeck (1983) indicates that, as well as tapping strategy 
knowledge constructs, the ILP probably also reflects 
intelligence and motivation, expressed through the nature of
strategy use. This was supported by Schmelzer1s (1991) 
LISREL analyses, which showed one ILP subscale pertaining to 
methodological study to load on both the motivation and 
intelligence constructs.
From this, it may be inferred that motivation and 
ability may have indirect pathways to performance via 
strategies. In particular, the differentiated motivational 
sub- constructs may not have a direct path to performance, as 
the global concept of motivation does in Figure 1. Rather, 
self-esteem will relate indirectly to what might be referred 
to as perceived effectance control (result of cognitive 
appraisal, includes locus of control) through self-efficacy 
beliefs and domain-specific (task-related) efficacy beliefs. 
Perceived effectance control will also be influenced by task 
characteristics and raw ability, and will relate directly 
and unidirectionally to strategy selection, since perceived 
locus of control will categorically affect strategy choice.
General- and Specific Strategy Knowledge are 
hypothesized to affect domain-specific self-efficacy, and 
thereby global self-efficacy and self-esteem, indirectly 
(due to their bidirectional relationships). General 
Strategy Knowledge and Specific Strategy Knowledge should 
relate through metacognitive processes inherent in their 
definitions, and Specific Strategy Knowledge should affect 
selection of learning strategies unidirectionally. The 
selection of strategies then affect overall performance
through strategy implementation in conjunction with effort. 
General Strategy Knowledge includes, by definition, 
attribution of success to effort, and thereby affects 
learning strategy implementation indirectly through effort. 
Effort may be anticipated to relate directly to overall 
academic performance as well, via effortful performance on 
evaluations such as exams.
Feedback on to-date performance will be looped back 
into the model, affecting domain-specific self-efficacy, 
General Strategy Knowledge and Specific Strategy Knowledge - 
all unidirectionally. Thus, the model may be regarded as 
having a temporal dimension of sorts, since the performance 
construct is cumulative, just as in academic life: the 
evaluation of overall performance at any point is how well 
the student has done in classes, collectively, up to that 
moment.
Finally, ability should have its expected direct 
effects on overall performance and strategy implementation 
(like effort). However, it is postulated that it will not 
directly affect strategy selection. Rather, it will affect 
it indirectly through the evaluative processes implicit in 
perceived effectance control.
Figure 2 depicts the more fully articulated model 
composed of these constructs and relationships, in 
replacement of the model in Figure 1.
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Figure 2. Present Theoretical Context.
The tests which were chosen for this study (including: 
Lumpkin 6-item Rotter, (L-6-R); Rosenberg Self-esteem Test, 
(RSE); Insufficient Effort subscale of the Levels of 
Attribution and Change Scale, (IES)) based upon indications 
by Borkowski, ec al. (1990) in the earlier metacognition
discussion, as well as the ILP and Shipley, can be examined 
within the context of this model and fitted into an 
operational counterpart.
Based on Figure 2, it can be inferred that the Shipley, 
as an operationalization of the raw ability/intellect 
construct, will relate unidirectionally to the self esteem 
measure (probably weakly), the locus of control measure 
(probably also weakly, since locus of control is only a part
of perceived effectance control), the learning style test 
(deep processing and fact retention subscales) and GPA.
The IES (Insufficient Effort subscale, see p. 26), as 
an index of the tendency to attribute success to effort, 
partly reflects General Strategy Knowledge (ala Borkowski, 
et al, 1990) and should relate to the self-esteem measure, 
the learning style test (methodological study and 
elaborative processing subscales), and the locus of control 
measure. The locus of control measure should show 
additional relationships with each of the other instruments, 
as well (with ILP: higher scores on all scales should 
correlate with increasing internality).
The postulated operational relationships are depicted 
in Figure 3, below.
Figure 3. Postulated Operational Model.
METHOD
This was a single - sample study, using undergraduate 
students at the University of North Dakota. The main thrust 
is to use multivariate regression analyses to construct a 
weighted equation for the combination of the test battery's 
scales in the prediction of school performance. Then, a 
subsample of subjects will be recalled to verify the 
reliability of the battery scales.
Subject Sample
The sample was drawn from undergraduate psychology 
courses at the University of North Dakota. Subjects in the 
sample received course extra credit for participation in the 
study. This sample was drawn for the purpose of performing 
multivariate regression analyses to construct a weighted 
equation for the combination of the test battery's scales in 
the prediction of school performance, and for structural 
analysis of the postulated academic performance model.
All subjects were treated in accordance with the 
ethical guidelines set forth by the American Psychological 
Association regarding use of human subjects.
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The Lumpkin (1985) abbreviated Rotter scale. This is
six-item rendition of the widely-accepted, original, 23- 
item, forced-choice Rotter (1966) scale. However, instead 
of using three forced-choice pairs of questions, three 
"internal" items and three "external" items were selected 
(see Table 3) and scored on a five-point Likert format 
suggested by Levenson (1974). These sets allegedly 
(Lumpkin, 1985) reflect both the "chance" and "internal" 
dimensions identified by Levenson (1974).
The Lumpkin (1985) results were based on a sample of 
3,009 usable responses, obtained from subjects by mailing. 
The Cronbach's alpha coefficient of internal consistency 
(Cronbach, 1951) was .68, which compares favorably with the 
range of .65 to .79 reported by Rotter (1966) and the .66 
for a six-item scale by Bugaighis & Schumm (1983) . Support 
for the validity of the measure was substantiated by 
replication of previously-known relationships between 
measures of locus of control and other concepts such as Lif 
Satisfaction and Perceived Risk, among others (Lumpkin, 
1985). Lumpkin concluded that the obtained results indicat 
that the scale has predictive validity.
The Rosenberg Self-este»m Scale (Rosenberg, 1989).
This is a ten-item Guttman scale which is reportedly 
unidimensional (Rosenberg, 1989). Table 4 contains the 
items on this scale. The author states its reproducibility
The Insufficient Effort subscale of the Levels of
Attribution and Change Scale (Norcross, et al., 1985). This 
subscale is part of a 60-item instrument that assesses the 
levels and loci of causal attributions about a self - selected 
problem. Research attt ,ts to the psychometric rigor of the 
whole scale (Norcross & Magletta, 1990; Norcross, et al., 
1985) .
The Insufficient Effort Subscale (see Table 5) contains 
six items with factor loadings ranging from .54 to .81, and 
with alpha coefficients of internal consistency reported at 
.83 (Norcross & Magletta, 1990) and .92 (Norcross, et al. , 
1985). Its test-retest coefficient was .84 at two weeks 
(Norcross & Magletta, 1990). Construct validity is 
evidenced by significant relationships with constructs such 
as social desirability, external chance and external others 
(Norcross & Magletta, 1990; Norcross, et al., 1985).
The test is scored on a five-point response format (1 = 
strongly disagree, 3 = undecided, 5 = strongly agree) and
to be 92 percent and its scalability to be 72 percent. 
Correlations with constructs such as depression and ability 
to criticize one's self are cited to support the validity of 
the measure further. The scale has been used diversely and 
extensively over the years, gaining support of its validity 
through relationships to job-related attitudes (Mohan &
Bali, 1988), self-evaluation (Hoelter, 1986) and 
p s y c h o p a t h '- "
the lead-in can be modified to fit various problems. In 
this study, the lead-in in Table 5 which reads "My problem 
is mostly due to...," will be altered to read "The quality 
of my academic performance is mostly due to...".
Inventory of Learning Processes (ILP). The ILP was 
derived by factor analyzing responses to a 121-item pool 
generated by three experts in learning and memory. The pool 
was compiled with the intent, on the part of each expert, of 
representing current knowledge and theory in their area.
The final inventory contains sixty-two items grouped 
into four scales (Schmeck, 1983): (1) Deep Processing -
deals with the extent to which students organize and 
evaluate what they study; (2) Methodological Study - deals 
with the frequency of studying and the employment of 
systematic techniques; (3) Fact Retention - relates to 
careful processing of detail; (4) Elaborative Processing - 
addresses the extent to which students personalize and apply 
information. Test-retest reliability of the scales ranged 
from .79 to .88. Numerous validity studies, some of which 
are discussed in Schmeck (1983), have been conducted and 
point to considerable, though slightly differential, 
validity of the four scales.
Shipley Institute of Living Scale. (SILS). The Shipley 
scale was initially developed to identify mild mental 
decrements in individuals of normal intelligence. According 
to Shipley (1940) it is also acceptable as a test of
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intelligence. According to Bartz and Loy (1970), 
correlations between Shipley scores and Full Scale WAIS IQ's 
have been found to range from .73 to .90, in a number of 
studies. Mack (1970) reports concordant results, with a 
correlation of .76 between Shipley scores and WAIS Full 
Scale IQ; similarly, Paulson and Lin (1970) report a 
correlation of .78 between Shipley total raw scores and WAIS 
Full Scale IQ. Statistical formulas for enhancing the 
predictive value of the test have also been developed (e.g., 
Zachary, Paulson and Gorsuch, 1985) .
The scale is comprised of a forty-item vocabulary test 
and a twenty-item abstract thinking test. Performance is 
often summarized in a C.Q. (Conceptual Quotient) score.
This score is the ratio of the patient's Abstraction-age to 
that of the 'normal' person receiving his vocabulary score. 
The ratio is multiplied by 100 to eliminate decimals 
(Shipley, 1940). However, since all individuals in this 
study are approximately the same age, only total raw scores 
will be used in analyses.
This instrument was standardized on 1,046 individuals, 
a group composed of students of fourth grade through college 
age. Mental-age equivalents were established, with 
students' available intelligence test data, for vocabulary, 
abstraction and composite scores. Reliability coefficients 
reportedly obtained from 322 army recruits were .87 for 
vocabulary, .89 for abstraction and .92 for the composite.
These measures already have known relationships to 
performance, and any or them can therefore serve as marker 
variables in their own right. As an example of the function 
of a marker as a red flag for sampling anomaly in the 
Schmelzer (1991) study, consider the intelligence estimate. 
The measure used was the Shipley Institute of Living Scale 
(Shipley, 1940). It is known that intelligence measures 
generally correlate about .50 with performance indices and 
that the Shipley correlates with the classic, Full Scale 
WAIS IQ (Wechsler, 1955) from .73 to .90 (Bartz & Loy, 1970; 
Mack, 1970; Paulson & Lin, 1970). However, the observed 
correlation between Shipley score and giade point average 
was only .26, suggesting an unspecified something amiss with 
the sample, which renders any inferences based on the 
results inconclusive.
Grade Point Average (G.P.A.). The criterion measure, 
subject. ' "mulative G.P.A.'s, was obtained during fall 
semester, 1992, with permission, from available records. 
G.P.A. is a year-to-date performance figure, reflecting the 
average grade obtained per credit-hour of study throughout a 
student's career.
Pro£Sdiir£
Data collection was done in group format, with each 
subject completing the six-item Lumpkin (1985) scale, the 
six-item Insufficient Effort, subscale of the Levels of 
Attribution and Change Scale (Norcross, et al., 1985), the
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ten-item Rosenberg (1989) Self-esteem Scale, the Inventory 
of Learning Processes test (Schmeck, 1983) and the Shipley 
Institute of Living Scale (Shipley, 1940). Written 
permission (see Appendix B for the consent form) was 
obtained to access G.P.A.'s (grade point averages) via 
computer. Subject data elements were identified and linked 
only by students' university identification numbers.
The battery's predictive validity was to be assessed 
tnrough multiple regression analysis. Stepwise and backward 
multiple regression analyses of RSE, L-6-R, IES, and SILS 
scores and ILP subscale scores were conducted to determine 
which measures stayed in the equation and to provide a 
weighted formula for combining the subscale scores to best 
predict performance.
In the main sample, the reliability of the battery was 
evaluated by an internal consistency and split-halves 
designs. The test-retest reliability of the battery was 
investigated within two to four weeks by retesting of a 
randomly selected, sex-balanced subsample.
Finally, LISREL-VI analyses (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1983) 
were performed to evaluate the overall motivational/perfor- 
mance model by determining the extent to which the proposed 
relationships matched those existing in the data. The 
operationalized model is shown in Figure 3 (p.32).
The LISREL model was specified such that each item was 
free to vary only on the factor with which it correlated
most highly (all other correlations set to zero), and 
subscales were allowed to load only on their latent 
constructs. The ILP subscales were allowed to have 
residuals, but the residuals were not allowed to correlate. 
The other measures did not have residuals. Multiple indices 
were used to evaluate the adequacy of the posited model: 
chi-square test, goodness-of - fit index, chi -square/degrees- 




The motivation assessment battery's predictive validity 
was assessed through multiple regression analyses. Stepwise 
and backward multiple regression analyses of RSE, L-6-R,
IES, and SILS scores and ILP subscale scores were conducted 
to determine which measures remained in the equations and to 
provide a weighted formula for combining the subscale scores 
to best predict performance. All analyses were conducted 
using SPSSx.
Stepwise regression analysis (N=226) revealed that, 
when the three motivational subscales and the four ILP 
subscales were all introduced as possible predictors, only 
SILS score, ILP subscale Methodological Study and the 
Insufficient Effort Scale were retained in the final 
regression equation. Collectively, these three indices 
accounted for about twenty-four percent of the variance in 
the criterion measure, G.P.A. (see Table 6).
The standard error of estimate was .587, indicating 
that to be 68% confident of including a subject's true 
grade-point average, one must add and subtract .587 from the 
predicted grade-point average. In other words, if a
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student's predicted G.P.A. was 3.00, one could be 68% 
confident that his or her true grade-point average would 
fall between 2.413 and 3.581.
The greatest relative contribution in this regression 
was made by the Shipley (SILS) score, with a beta weight of 
.316 (see Table 6). This was followed, in respective order 
by Methodological Study (beta wt.=.232) and Insufficient 
Effort (beta wt.=.173). All elements of the correlation 
matrix were observed to be less than .50.
Table 6
Stepwise Regression of SILS. RSE. L-6-R & ILP Scales on 
£_--_P_. A .
R=.490 R2=.240 Std. Error=.587F=23.414 Signif. F=.0000
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig. T
SILS Total Raw Score .026 .005 .316 5.299 . 000ILP: Method. Study .042 .012 .232 3.614 .000Mot. : Insuff. Effort .021 . 008 .173 2.658 .008Constant .944 .325 2.901 .004
Interestingly, the backward regression of the same 
elements yielded slightly different results. In this 
analysis, SILS score, Methodological Study and Insufficient 
Effort were accompanied by ILP subscale Deep Processing as 
useful predictors of G.P.A. However, the amount of variance 
in grade performance accounted for by these four was only
twenty-five percent (Table 7), as opposed to 24%, found in 
the stepwise analysis. Deep Processing made the smallest 
relative contribution to predicting grades. Its inclusion 
in the final equation of the backward regression, but not in 
the stepwise procedure may reflect the arbitrary 
significance cutoffs utilized in each (.10 v. .05), or may 
suggest that Deep Processing may share variance with another 
variable.
The standard error of estimate was .583. Thus, if a 
student's predicted grade point average was 3.00, one could 
be 68% certain that his or her true G.P.A. would fall 
between 2.42 and 3.58.
Table 7
Backward Regression of SILS. RSE. L-6-R & ILP Scales on 
G.P.A,
R=.502 R2=.251 Std. Error=.58300rHII 663 Signif. F=.0000
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig.
ILP: Method. Study .043 .012 .239 3.741 .000SILS Total Raw Score .022 .005 .274 4.331 .000Mot. : Insuff. Effort .016 .008 .134 1.959 .051ILP: Deep Processing .023 .012 .126 1.895 .059Constant .910 .324 2.807 .005
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Reliability
Reliabilities were computed individually for each of 
the motivation battery's subscales, using split-halves and 
internal consistency designs. Table 8 shows the results of 
these analyses. Test-retest figures are shown in Table 9.
The results of the initial reliability analyses were 
not entirely similar to those reported by previous investi­
gators. Most noticeably, the L-6-R - with a Cronbach's 
alpha coefficient of internal consistency (Cronbach, 1951) 
=.23 - was not close to the .68 alpha reported by Lumpkin in 
1985. However, the Lumpkin scale is composed of two sets of 
"internal" and "external" locus of control items, which 
theoretically indicate opposite content dimensions. This 
clearly contributes to the poor internal consistency. A 
more meaningful statistic is the Spearman-Brown estimate of 
split-halves reliability. Based on the polarity of content
Table 8
Reliability Estimates for Motivation Battery Subscales
Subscale: L-6-R R S E IE£
Int. Consis. Ests.Alpha: .23 .75 .79
Split-halves Ests.Spearman-Brown: - .71 .79 .84
just mentioned, an investigator would expect this statistic
to yield a strong negative correlation between the two
46
halves, and this is in fact the case. Split-halves 
reliability was -.71, which is consistent with the 
reliability figures given by Lumpkin (1985).
The IES (alpha=.79) result was somewhat lower than 
those obtained by Norcross & Magletta (1990; alpha=.83) and 
Norcross, et al. (1985; alpha=.92), though, perhaps, not 
vastly so.
Similarly, the Rosenberg scale (RSE) obtained an alpha 
of .79, which was fairly close to the scalability of 72 
percent initially indicated by Rosenberg (1968).
Test-retest reliabilities were also conducted. These 
results were rather interesting and are printed in Table 9. 
After the initial data gathering was conducted, a randomly 
selected, sex-balanced subsample of 40 individuals was
Table 9
Test-Retest Indices of Reliability for Motivation Battery
Scales,*
Scale r ELumpkin 6 -1tern
Locus of Control Scale - .014 .465
Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale .973 .000
Levels of Attribution & Change Scale
Insufficient Effort Subscale .677 .000
assembled and retested within three to four weeks of the 
first testing. On retesting, subjects completed only the
twenty-two items, total, in the three subscales of the 
motivation battery. Pearson correlation coefficients were 
computed for the simple correlation between the two 
testings, as an indication of reliability. As can be seen 
from Table 9, the subtests varied in their stability across 
time. The two testings of the locus of control index had a 
surprising near-zero correlation, while the remaining two 
scales showed much more substantial reliability (RSE: 
r=,973, p=.000; IES: r=.677, p=.000).
The Model
Finally, the operational model was tested by 
implementing LISREL-VI (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1983) analyses to 
examine how well observed relationships in the data matched 
those specified in the model. The reader will recall that 
the theoretical model (Figure 2, page 30) was fairly 
complex, whereas the operational model (Figure 3, page 32) 
was much less so. Although the theory provided pretty firm 
bases for constructing the operational model as depicted in 
Figure 3, there was still room left for some doubt as to how 
well measures in the operational model mapped onto 
constructs or pathways in the theoretical model. In essence 
then, the possibility remained that the operational model 
was not stipulated correctly. Indeed, this was the case; 
for, using structural relations specified in the operational 
model, the LISREL program was unable to perform the 
necessary analyses to evaluate the goodness of the model.
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The reader will recall that the LISREL model was 
specified such that each element was free to vary only on 
the factor with which it correlated most highly (all other 
correlations set to zero), and subscales were allowed to 
load only on their latent constructs. The ILP subscales 
were allowed to have residuals, but the residuals were not 
allowed to correlate. The other measures did not have 
residuals. Multiple indices were t o  have been used to 
evaluate the adequacy of the posited model: chi-square 
test, goodness-of - fit index, chi -square/degrees-of - freedom 
ratio and the Tucker-Lewis index (Tucker & Lewis, 1973) .
Part of the problem was inferred to be related to the 
recursiveness inherent in the operational model by dint of 
the bidirectional relationships posited between the RSE, the 
L-6-R and the IES. In a sense, this creates a situation 
characterized by too many unknowns and too few equations 
with which to solve for them. Thus, on this premise several 
attempts were made to simplify the number of calculations to 
be done in the analysis, by restricting various error 
matrices associated with the factorial and structural 
aspects of the model, without altering the postulated 
relationships. All of these attempts failed. Goodness of 
fit findings were very poor, suggesting that the operational 
model was inadequate or too complex and in need of
reexamination.
No data was available to indicate clearly whether or 
how the model should be modified. It seemed that the most 
probable source of difficulty might be the mapping question 
regarding how well constructs and relationships from the 
theoretical model were represented in the operational model. 
Close analysis of the contents of each subscale, and 
comparison of these contents with the corresponding 
theoretical constructs revealed that some mismapping may 
have occurred.
To summarize these findings briefly, the two 
bidirectional relationships previously stipulated (the RSE 
to L-6-R and IES to L-6-R relationships) were found not to 
be appropriate since the content of the measures did not 
reflect theoretical constructs as fully as had initially 
been presumed, and the IES to RSE relationship was found to 
be posited in the wrong direction, on similar ground. This 
latter point matters little to the LISREL program and so was 
not an especially substantial change. However, alteration 
of the bidirectional relationships eliminated the 
recursiveness of the model altogether. The unidirectional 
relationships and new operational model can be seen in 
Figure 4 (next page), overlaid with LISREL final parameters 
(akin to path coefficients in path analysis). Since 
reformulation was effected without reference to statistical 
information, it is inferred that, idiosyncrasies in the 
subject sample were not potentiated in the new model.
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Figure 4. Reformulated Operational Model.
It is interesting to note that the bidirectional 
relationships ware initially thought essential to an 
adequate representation of the theoretical model, but later 
found not to exist in the content of the measures used. If 
nothing else, this highlights both the difficuDty of 
operationalizing complex models and the need to attend very 
closely to the precise nature of instrument content when 
doing so (recall Robinson & Shaver, 1973 and Wylie, 1974, 
1979, mentioned earlier).
Inspection of the path estimates in Figure 4 reveals 
essentially zero-order relationships between the 
intelligence, self-esteem and locus of control measures, as 
well as between locus of control and effort indices. This 
may partly reflect the limited utility of the locus of 
control construct in this context, as well as the 
possibility that some of the other underlying constructs may 
not relate as theorized. Other relationships were 
significantly greater than zero, in concordance with
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previous work, as exemplified by the relationship between 
Mehodological Study and grades for instance.
The f.o rementioned multiple indices were then applied to 
evaluate the adequacy of the reformulated operational model: 
chi-square test, goodness-of - fit index, chi-square/degrees- 
of-freedom ratio and the Tucker-Lewis index (Tucker & Lewis, 
1973) .
The chi-square for the new operational model - 
heretofore referred to simply as the operational model, was 
significant (X2=86.43, p=.000). In this test, significance 
is undesirable since it suggests that the model does not fit 
the data - it leaves some of the variance unexplained. 
Hov'ever, because the chi-square is a test with a great deal 
of statistical power and a known tendency to produce 
spurious indications of significance with high N's, the 
other indices were used to cross validate the chi-square 
test result.
The goodness of fit index for the operational model was 
.914. The adjusted goodness of fit index (adjusted for 
degrees of freedom) was .824.
The chi -square/degrees-of - freedom ratio was also 
computed for the model. A frequently utilized range of 
acceptable values for this statistic is 2.0-5.0. The chi - 
square/degrees-of - freedom ratio for the operational model 
was 3.93.
Finally, the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) was employed, 
which involves the comparison of the proposed model to a 
null model whic.i posits no relationships in the data. This 
index is an incremental fit index which shows how much 
better the model accounts for the data than does the null. 
TLI=.589 for the model.
In summary, the fit of the operational model was good, 
but not perfect. It left approximately seven to eight 
percent of the total variances and covariances found in the 
data unexplained. Although this represents a probable gain 
in comparison to the way the model was specified previously 
(Schmelzer, 1991), it still may suggest the need for the 
specification of additional parameters in further conceptual 
refinements. The LISREL analyses which were used to assess 
the general fit of the model to the data also included 
analyses which were utilized to determine the adequacy of 
the parameters which were included.
This process is facilitated by modification indices 
(Table 10), provided by the LISREL program, in which values 
of 5.0 or greater indicate problems in construct 
specification. Scrutiny of the modification indices 
revealed ILP subscale Methodological Study to have the 
highest index with a value of 25.595. In parallel to 
findings by Schmelzer (1991) in which this subscale was 
found to load on the constructs of grade performance, 
motivation and intelligence, these analyses indicated that
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Methodological Study tends to load on grade performance, 




G.P.A. L-6-R RSE IES SILSTotG. P.A. L-6-R -0.565RSE 0.070IES 0.902SILSTot 0.043 -0.096 0.493 -1.173 0.055ILP: A -0.651 0.132 2.967 -0.402 0.949B 2.340 0.271 -0.275 3.525 -1.708C -0.368 -0.868 0.498 -0.589 0.402D -0.366 1.565 -0.026 -0.190 0.125
ILP-A ILP - B ILP -C ILP -DILP: B -2.076C 1.100 -1.294D 0.226 1.630 -1.124
*Zero values not printed.
The LISREL program also provides tabulation of 
normalized residuals (Table 10), which refer to that part of 
a relationship between two specified variables which is not 
addressed by the model. Commonly, values of 2.0 or greater 
are regarded as indicative of specification problems.
Review of the residuals revealed significant normalized 
residuals for Methodological Study in reference to G.P.A., 
IES and ILP subscale Deep Processing. These residuals were 
2.34, 3.53 and -2.08, respectively. In addition, a 
significant residual of 2.97 was found for the relationship
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between Deep Processing and the RSE. No other significant 
normalized residuals were present.
DISCUSSION
Predictive Validity
The reader will recall that multiple regression was 
employed to evaluate the predictive utility of the 
motivational assessment battery within the operational 
model. Stepwise and backward regressions were conducted 
(N=226) incorporating the battery measures (RSE, L-6-R &
IES), SILS total raw score and the four subscale scores of 
the ILP. Three indices accounted for about twenty-four 
percent of the variance in grade-point average in the 
stepwise regression, with a standard error of estimate of 
.587: SILS score, ILP scale Methodological Study and the IES 
(see Table 6, page 41). The same indices were retained in 
the backward regression, with the addition of ILP subscale 
Deep Processing. Total variance accounted for was 
incremented by only about one percent however, and the 
standard error of estimate was still high at .583. The two 
ILP scales evidently share some variance, based on these 
results - which is consistent with previous findings 
(Schmelzer, 1991).
Overall, the regression analyses suggest that, while 
the operational measurement model does succeed in addressing
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a substantial part of the variance in collegiate grade-point 
average, there remains a larger portion which is 
unaddressed. A portion of the unexplained variance is 
attributable to chance error, but it is probable that much 
is due to the presence of other unspecified variables at 
work. Further, any variable may contribute differentially 
to various courses or types of course. The question of the 
relative contribution of chance versus that of an unspeci­
fied other variable or variables may not be directly answer- 
able, but some benefit can be derived from examining the 
issue somewhat further.
Reliability
An issue which has some bearing on that of error is 
reliability, especially retest reliability. Internal 
consistency, split-halves and test-retest reliability 
estimates were obtained for the scales in the motivational 
assessment battery (Tables 8 & 9). The internal consistency 
and split-halves statistics also relate to validity in that 
they essentially reflect the combined effects of the degree 
of content consistency across items, and the consistency of 
a subject's responses to those items.
The results of the internal consistency and split- 
halves analyses (Table 8) were very comparable to those 
stated by other researchers, so it is inferred that validity 
in this sample is good and that the contribution of error, 
or chance variation, is proportionally small. This would
lend support to the inference that, if the operational model 
is correct and adequate in terms of the constituents and 
relationships specified therein, other parameters exist 
which have not been identified and included.
However, the test-retest correlations (Table 9) appear 
to raise some questions about the role of error in the 
general results. The main concern seems to be the L-6-R, 
which yielded a near-zero correlation between testings (r=- 
0.14, p-.465). This correlation is so poor that a computer 
programming or scoring error was suspected. Inspection 
revealed that this was not the case. Further consideration 
led this investigator to speculate that the retest data 
could conceivably have been skewed by a lackadaisical 
approach to testing on the second test date, due to 
familiarity of content, fewer items and lateness in the 
academic semester. This hypothesized effect may also be 
enhanced by small size of the retest sample, as well as by 
the cumulative nature of the grade-point statistic.
If this simple supposition of an overall poor approach 
to retesting had indeed been the case, then one would expect 
to see similarly poor retest results for the other two 
scales. The results did not coincide with this expectation. 
To the contrary, the figure for the IES was fairly good 
(r=.677, p=.000) and that of the RSE was almost too high 
(r=.973, p=.000). Given the goodness of the other 
reliability results from both testings however, the weakness
in the L-6-R retest reliability is anomalous and requires 
some other explanation.
Aside from questioning the psychometric quality of the 
Lumpkin measure, the only other apparent simple explanation 
is that perhaps the 'sloppy retesting attitude1 hypothesis 
was initially in effect since the L-6-R does not evoke 
strong ego-related self-attributions, but that the remaining 
tests were too ego-involving to sustain a lax approach, thus 
resulting in higher effort and better consistency.
Nonetheless, the preponderance of the reliability data 
allows the inference that the portion of the unexplained 
variance in grade-point average is probably not largely 
error, but rather some unidentified variable or variables. 
Again, this is allowing, for the moment, the questionable 
assumption that the operational model is not inherently 
flawed.
Adequacy of the Operational Model
The operational model (Figure 3, p.32) was tested by 
using LISREL-VI (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1983) analyses to 
examine how well che empirical relationships in the data 
matched those specified in the model. It was inferred that 
the match was not good initially, since, as mentioned in the 
Results section, above, it was not even possible to run the 
analyses at that time. It was found, after numerous other 
approaches had been made, that the operational model did not 
map onto the theoretical model as had been originally
concluded. Careful assessment of subscales1 item content 
revealed how the mismapping had occurred and yielded 
indications as to how the model should have been specified. 
The result is depicted in Figure 4 (p. 50) and reproduced 
below without path coefficients (Figure 3 may be found for 
comparison on page 33).
Figure 4. Reformulated Operational Model (reproduction).
As a result of the model modification, it became 
possible to perform the LISREL analyses. The chi-square 
test, goodness-of - fit index, chi -square/degrees-of - freedom 
ratio and the Tucker-Lewis index (Tucker & Lewis, 1973) were 
applied to evaluate the adequacy of the operational model.
The chi-square was found to be significant (X2=86.43, 
p=.000), which means that the model does not fit the data 
perfectly. This finding was not especially troubling since
the chi-square is known to be overly sensitive with high 
N's, due to its tremendous statistical power.
The unadjusted goodness-of - fit index was .914, which 
suggests that the model accounts for about ninety-one 
percent of the total variances and covariances in the sample 
data, or conversely that only about eight or nine percent of 
the total variances and covariances in the data were not 
addressed by the model as specified. This is to be expected 
given the limited extent to which the operational model has 
been developed, especially with respect to the complex 
relationships included in the theoretical model.
The TLI was .589 for the model. Usually, results equal 
to or greater than .90 suggest model adequacy, whereas 
values below this cutoff are considered indicative of a need 
for model enhancement.
The LISREL program provides modification indices which 
can be used to identify weaknesses or trouble spots in model 
specification, and these results, in parallel to Schmelzer 
(1991), indicated that important relationships had not been 
specified with respect to ILP subscale Methodological Study 
and the latent constructs effort, intelligence and grade 
performance (indices of 9.94, 25.60 and 5.12, respectively). 
In addition, the index associated with the relationship 
between ILP scale Deep Processing and the latent construct 
self esteem was also substantial at 13.50.
Of first interest here is the relationship between 
Methodological Ctudy and effort. This relationship is 
intuitively evident and in operational terms would probably 
point to a correlation between Methodological Study and the 
IES. In fact, examination of the normalized residuals in 
Table 10 indicates that this is a significant relationship 
needing specification in the model. This would be expected 
since the items on Methodological Study largely address 
effortful activities such as outlining, rehearsing or 
paraphrasing. On a theoretical level, this doubtless 
reflects the relatedness of specific strategy knowledge to 
the general strategy knowledge that effort is central to 
success.
Significant residuals were also observed between 
Methodological Study and Deep Processing. This probably 
reflects an overlap between the two processes addressed by 
these scales and highlights a lack of discreteness in those 
scales. It also points to a need to determine more 
precisely how the ILP subscales map onto the overall 
theoretical model, since it is clear that the subscales 
occasionally incorporate multiple constructs and do not all 
map onto the same constructs.
Finally, Deep Processing and self-esteem were 
highlighted by the modification indices and the relationship 
between the scale representing self-esteem, the RSE, and 
Deep Processing had a significant normalized residual
(2.967). On the face of it, this seems a peculiar 
association, but to understand it the reader may recall the 
earlier discussion of the metacognition/self - system 
interface. The relationship may be supportive of the belief 
on the part of Borkowski, et al (1990) that general strategy 
knowledge and positive self-esteem are bidirectionally 
related and mutually influential. Research does indicate 
that the self-system supports metacognitive functions and 
academic performance alike (Mccombs, 1986).
Conclusions
The results of this study have been encouraging in 
several respects. LISREL analyses have shown that, after 
correctly mapping measures to constructs in the process of 
operationalizing the theoretical model, the model succeeded 
very well in addressing the relationships found in the data. 
Ninety-two percent of the variance in the data was accounted 
for by the model. Need for modification within the model is 
relatively little, with possibilities including specifica­
tion of only a few additional relationships. These are 
primarily corresponding to scales on the ILP, which need to 
be examined more closely with respect to their fit in the 
overall model.
In addition, the model succeeded in accounting for 
about one quarter of the variance in grade point average, 
which is a sizeable portion. Indices of intelligence, study
habits and effort were the most useful elements in 
predicting grade performance, though some of the 
relationships were weaker than had been expected. A larger 
portion of the variance in grade-point average was 
unexplained in the multiple regressions, and scrutiny of all 
the data leads to the conclusion that the operational model 
needs expansion and additional indices may need to be 
incorporated as predictors. It may also be that some of the 
included predictors were not potentiated, due to design 
features.
Several considerations support the probability that the 
relationships between some of the predictors in the study 
and the criterion may have been attenuated. A case in point 
is the correlation between SILS score and grade-point 
average. As a measure or intelligence, one would expect the 
SILS score to correlate around .50 with grade performance, 
since most such indices do so. However, the correlation 
observed here was only .35.
It is inferred that this weaker-than-expected 
correlation may point to a broad attenuation of 
relationships throughout the data set. This weakening of 
correlations may rest in part in the manner of presentation 
of the instruments. It may well be that presentation of 
multiple instruments to subjects alters the testing and 
response context. Stibjects may become involved with trying 
to understand or discern what the investigation is about,
and with presenting consistently with respect to this 
perception, rather than with simply providing information. 
Thus, subjects may have different perceptions of the nature 
of the task due to the context which is created by 
simultaneous presentation.
Another source of weakness may be the criterion measure 
itself. This becomes apparent if the reader considers the 
nature of college grade-point average as a criterion 
measure. Curricula vary with each student as a function of 
various factors including interest, anticipated proficiency, 
career choice and discipline requirements. Then too, the 
interaction of various intrapersonal variables, such as 
intelligence, stage of personal development, achievement 
orientation and study style - to mention only a few - can 
affect performance uniquely as well. For instance, bright 
students may enroll in hard classes, such as advanced 
physics or multivariate calculus, which may result in 
relatively lower grades; or performance-oriented students, 
regardless of ability, may drop all but the classes in which 
they can perform with excellence; students with undecided 
majors may take a variety of classes, doing well in some, 
poorly in others. Thus, examination of different students 
with identical G.P.A.'s is a comparison of apples and 
oranges, in a certain sense. Practically speaking, it means 
that the prediction of the grade-point criterion will be 
loose regardless of the predictor or predictors used. Work
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by Cattell and others (Barton, et al., 1971, 1972; Cattell, 
et al., 1972; Dielman, et al., 1970, 1971; Schuerger, et 
al., 1970) suggests that prediction of grade performances 
might be better if the criterion index were individual class 
grades, although many of the same arguments would apply.
A third source of weakness may reside in the 
interaction of context with developmental considerations. 
College students doubtless vary in terms of the ways in 
which they attribute, rationalize or justify their 
performances, their personal abilities and their 
preferences. However, they probably compartmentalize things 
far more than younger students would. It is reasonable to 
expect that college students have quicker, more diversified 
means of maintaining positive self-esteem - as indicated by 
research evidence on perceived competence (Harter, 1982a; 
Nicholls, 1984), mastery (Ames & Archer, 1988),social 
cognition (Maehr & Stallings, 1972), self-worth (Covington, 
1984) and self-serving attributional biases (Nicholls, 1976; 
Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1983; Jagacinski & Nicholls, 1990). 
Therefore, self-reports of college students may not directly 
reflect their true characteristics, but may instead reflect 
the extent to which they try to "present good" to themselves 
and others.
This effect may interact with the way in which the 
subject perceives the nature of the data collection 
situation, which is to say, the "extra" or "beyond-face-
value" meaning that the student attributes to various 
measures as a result of their simultaneous presentation. 
Clearly, such a method will yield highly idiosyncratic 
results across subjects, depending on how each subject 
assesses the situation and how their self-system is 
mobilized in response to that appraisal.
This format of presenting multiple self-report 
instruments, which might be described as a "context 
inviting" design, probably represents a design weakness 
here, but is not rare in the research literature. In all 
instances, this design consideration needs to be considered 
seriously and addressed systematically.
Directions for Future Research
It should be clear then, that regardless of what 
parameters are included in studies subsequent to this one, 
the "invited context" will need to be compensated for or 
addressed in some way, if college students are used.
Of course, one viable possibility is not to use college 
students, but rather, to use students in the elementary 
grades where questions of motivation and ability are more 
pertinent and the answers more significant. This is a more 
appropriate direction in which to proceed, the good sense of 
which becomes more evident when one considers the value of 
being able to discriminate low ability from motivational or 
metacognitive deficits in a school-age child. The
cumulative effects of correct versus incorrect intervention 
on this regard could be astonishing, whereas for a college 
student the point is almost moot.
While study of younger students may lessen the 
deleterious, confounding impact of the "invited context" 
problem, the assumption that the effect is eliminated by use 
of a younger, presumably simpler population is dubious. The 
question still needs to be addressed to assure clear 
results.
One possible methodology might involve having the 
various measures completed by students in a more 
naturalistic setting, one instrument at a time. For, 
instance, the invited context might be eliminated simply by 
having students complete one subscale every day or so during 
regular class time. Using this technique might raise some 
minor questions about time delay, but it will certainly 
reduce the tendency to "size up" the global testing context. 
Instead students would very likely see each measure as "just 
another one of those tests," and approach each individually. 
Clearly the time delay becomes a factor when more measures 
are involved.
If more parameters need to be specified to enhance the 
accuracy of prediction, a question arises as to what may be 
added without making the battery of subscales too cumbersome 
or lengthy to be used. Reference to the theoretical model 
developed so far suggests that additional constructs can be
identified for inclusion. However, it also brings to mind 
some other considerations. In particular, measures did not 
map onto constructs well in this study to begin with. It 
may have been that appropriate constructs were included in 
this study, but that they were not identified and specified.
A good example - which is substantiated by the LISREL 
modification indices - is the scales of the ILP, where 
multiple constructs could be seen in each subscale. A 
number of relationships should be added to the operational 
models in future inquiries. Future efforts should probably 
also include a parallel effort to clarify the ILP's factor 
structure with reference to the metacognitive, self-system 
and attributional factors identified here.
Of course, clarification of the nature of the ILP 
subscales represents another level of analysis. Research is 
being conducted continuously by various investigators 
inquiring into the nature of what might be referred to as 
different 'paths' to the academic performance criterion, 
namely grades. Borkowski, et al.(1991), for instance, 
represent a level of analysis similar to that of this study, 
in which the goal is the advancement of empirically 
supported theoretical models of elusive concepts, through 
successive iterations of theory, research and further 
articulation. In a Kuhnian sense, this is roughly 
equivalent to deliberate search for a paradigm. The goal is 
synthesis, or perhaps even synergy of ideas. In comparison,
other lines of work on differing levels of analysis may 
represent "normal science" in the sense of fleshing out the 
relationships between what - with reference to the 
theoretical model here - might be called path elements.
Ready examples are the research programs which investigate 
the relationships or natures of slightly narrower concepts 
such as in attribution theory (e.g. Weiner: Weiner, 1979, 
1980a, 1980b, 1982, 1983, 1985; Weiner & Kukla, 1970;
Weiner, et al, 1971; Weiner, et al, 1976; Weiner, et al, 
1978; Weiner, et al, 1979; Weiner, et al, 1982; Weiner, 
Graham & Chandler, 1982; Weiner & Graham 1984; Weiner & 
Handel, 1985). Within this area alone, even further levels 
of focus can be identified which represent investigation 
more basic constructs and their constituents - such as the 
self-serving attributional bias literature (e.g. reviews: 
Harvey and Weary, 1981; Weiner, 1978) which even includes 
study of possible anticipatory mechanisms which trigger the 
process (Nicholls, 1976; Berglas & Jones 1978; Covington & 
Omelich, 1981; Snyder & Wicklund, 1981; Pyszczinski & 
Greenberg, 1983; Jagacinski & Nicholls, 1990).
Finally, it should be clear from the various discussion 
and diagrams in this and the preceding discourse that some 
of the constructs involved are in heirarchial relationships, 
by level of analysis or specificity. A good example is the 
pathway between self-esteem and perceived effectance 
control, which goes from the higher-order, more global
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construct of self-ejteem to the lower-order, more situation- 
specific concept of perceived efficacy - with a few 
intermediate levels of analysis in between. Bidirectional 
relationships and recursive series of relationships are also 
probably present, as in the interface between self- and 
metacognitive systems. Clearly, future investigations in 
this vein of inquiry will require that due consideration 
must be given, when a priori statistical analysis decisions 
are made, to the possibility that heirarchial, recursive and 




COLLEGIATE ACADEMIC MOTIVATION (CAM) TEST Initial Item Pool Assessment of School Motivation
The following is an initial pool of items which will be used 
in the construction of an instrument to assess school motivation. Your answers here will be used to determine which items will be retained in the final form of the test, so it is important that you respond to every item and do not omit any.
Respond to each item according to how much that statement characterizes you in general, in regard to school and academic issues. Remember to answer based on your overall thoughts, beliefs, or feelings and not in terms of your temporary state of mind.
Blacken the dot that corresponds to your response (1-almost always/ 2-often/3-sometimes/4-not often/5-almost never).
I enjoy school.
My school studies are boring.
Learning, in school, is useful.
I feel forced to be in school.
I want to understand what I study.
How well I do in school is in my own hands. 
I want to learn.
My grades are controlled by someone else.
I am at school against my will.
1 2 3 4 5 
0 0 0 O 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 




I am very curious about things.
I'd rather work or play than have to learn 
something.
What I do determines my grades.
I enjoy learning for learning's sake.
I feel good about myself at school.
I feel smart during school.
I wish I could disappear when I'm at school.
I feel capable enough in school.
I feel bad about myself at school.
If I am failing it is my own fault.
My successes are because of my natural ability.
When I fail, it is because I wasn't trying hard enough.
When I succeed at something, it is because I was very interested in it.
If I succeed I have put a lot of effort into it.
My failures happen due to lack of interest on my 
part.
I fail because I don't have enough ability.
If I am failing it is not my fault.
If I am having trouble, I try harder.
It is hard for me to pay attention in class.
1 2 3 4 5
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
o o o c o
o o o o o
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
74
1 2 3 4 5
I encounter tasks at school that seem impossible. 0 0 0 0 0
If I am having trouble, I give up. 0 0 0 0 0
I won't be able to raise my grades. 0 o 0 0 0
I expect successes at school. 0 0 0 0 0
I feel helpless at school. 0 0 0 o 0
I expect to fail in things I do at school. 0 0 0 0 0
Doing well in academics is important to me. 0 0 0 0 0
Good school performance will help me get ahead
in life. 0 0 0 o o
I don't care about school. 0 0 0 0 0
I work for good grades just to get a better job
after I graduate. 0 0 0 o 0
I prefer to answer a question in class only if 1
am sure I am right. 0 0 0 0 o
I only like to ask "good" questions. 0 0 0 0 0
I will ask a question even if others might think
it is dumb. 0 0 0 0 0
I prefer easy tasks. 0 0 0 0 0
I like assignments that seem challenging. 0 0 0 0 0
I prefer tasks that seem impossible. 0 0 0 0 0
I will pick a task at which I know I can easily
succeed. 0 0 0 0 0
My performance in school has a strong effect on
how I see myself. 0 0 0 0 0
I reduce my effort on something if I think I
may fail at it. 0 0 0 0 0
If I had a choice, no one could force me to go
to school. O 0 0 0 0
If I think I may fail, I try harder.
If I had a choice, I sure wouldn't do school 
work.
I intend to do the best I can with academics. 
I am not in good health at school.
I intend to get higher grades.
I am well-rested when I get to school.
o 0 0 0 o
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
On an important task, if I think it is too hard,I will spend less energy on it. 0 0 0 0 0
The causes of my academic troubles are under my
control. 0 0 0 0 0
The causes of my academic troubles are permanent. 0 0 0 0 0
I intend to succeed and do succeed’. 0 O 0 0 0
The causes of my academic successes are not under 
my control. 0 0 0 0 0
The causes of my academic successes are permanent. 0 0 0 0 0
In the past, when I have succeeded, it was 
because I got lucky, rather than because I meant to succeed.
The causes of my academic troubles are temporary.
In the past, when I have succeeded, it was 
because I meant to, and not because of good luck.
School is just a means to an end, for me.
I find that I don’t want to pay attention in 
class.
I find it easy to pay attention in classes.
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0
Appendix B
Sample consent form.
STUDY DESCRIPTION & STATEMENT OF CONSENT
The purpose of this research is to develop a test battery to assess academic motivation. Ultimately, when used with ap­propriate intelligence and study strategy measures, it 
should help to provide better estimates of how well students will do in school. It will also be useful for identifying motivational deficiencies, as opposed to lack of ability, in students who don't do well.
You are invited to assist in this effort by contributing to the data needed for this battery to be developed. You will be asked to complete four subtests about your perceived con­trol, self-esteem, study habits and how you attribute your academic performance. You will also be asked to complete a quick intelligence measure. It should take less than an hour to complete them. In addition, we ask your permission to access your cumulative grade point average, via the uni­versity mainframe. Only your NAID number will be used to link this information to your data in our analyses. Some of you will be randomly selected to retest in about two to four weeks. The procedure will be the same.
Any identifying materials will be destroyed after the data has been collected, so that confidentiality can be assured. You may have a copy of this consent form for your records, upon request.
Agreement to Participate
I have read all of the information above regarding the pur­pose and nature of this research effort and willingly agree to participate. I am aware that my grade point average 
statistic is needed and hereby give my consent tor the re­







This instrument has been designed to determine how individuals differ on some important aspects of their study- behaviors. Some items reflect how a student might feel about the success of his/her study efforts and other items ask about certain study behaviors. No attempt has been made to hide the true intent of this questionnaire. You may find that you are being asked about certain study behaviors you realize are appropriate, but that such behaviors may not reflect how you actually attempt to learn. Your answers should reflect what your actual behavior is like. Please indicate whether each item is mostly a true or false description of your behavior in this type of course (a course covering facts and concepts through lecture and reading).
__ 1. I find it difficult to handle questions requiringcomparison of different concepts.
__ 2. I maintain a daily schedule of study hours.
__ 3. I can usually formulate a good guess even when Ido not know the answer.
__ 4. I would rather read the original article than asummary.
5. While studying, I attempt to find answers toquestions I have in mind.
__ 6. I have regular weekly review periods.
__ 7. I daydream about things I have studied.
__ 8. I increase my vocabulary by building lists of newterms.
_ 9. I have trouble making inferences.
_ 10. I am very good at learning formulas, names, anddates.
11. I get good grades on term papers.
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__ 12. I always make a special effort to get all the details.
__ 13. I try to convert facts into "rules of thumb."
__ 14. I have trouble remembering definitions.
__ 15. I think fast.
__ 16. I generally write an outline of the material I read.
__ 17. I am usually able to design procedures for solving problems.
__ 18. I generally read beyond what is assigned in class.
__ 19. I do well on essay tests.
__ 20. I make simple charts and diagrams to help me remember material.
__ 21. When learning a unit of material, I usually 
summarize it in my own words.
__ 22. I do well on examinations requiring factual information.
__ 23. I have difficulty learning how to study for a course.
__ 24. I work through practice exercises ana .ample problems.
__25. I learn new words and ideas by associating them with words and ideas I already know.
__ 26. I cram for exams.
__ 27. I read critically.
__ 28. I make frequent use of a dictionary.
__ 29. I look for reasons behind the facts.
__ 30. I spend more time studying than most of my friends.
Even when I know that I have carefully learned the material, I have trouble remembering it for an examination.
For examinations, I memorize the material as given in the text or class notes.
I learn new words or ideas by visualizing a situation in which they could occur.
Getting myself to begin studying is usually difficult.
I find it difficult to handle questions requiring critical evaluation.
New concepts usually make me think of similar concepts.
I can usually state the underlying message of films and readings.
I usually refer to several sources in order to understand a concept.
I often have difficulty finding the right words for expressing my ideas.
I review course material periodically during the term.
After reading a unit of material, I sit and think about it.
I have a regular place to study.
I have trouble organizing the information I 
remember.
When necessary, I can easily locate particular passages in a textbook.
I learn new concepts by expressing them in my own 
words.
I do well on tests requiring definitions.
I have difficulty planning work when confronted with a complex task.
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__ 48. Even when I feel I have learned the material, continue to study it. I
__ 49. I learn new ideas by relating them to similar ideas.
__ 50. I frequently use the library.
__ 51. I often memorize material I do not understand.
__ 52. Toward the end of a course, I prepare an overview of all material covered.
__ 53. While learning new concepts, practical applications often come to mind.
__ 54. My memory is actually pretty poor.
__ 55. I ignore conflicts between the information obtained from different sources.
__ 56. I prepare a set of notes integrating the information from all sources in a course.
__ 57. When I study something I devise a system for later recalling it.
58 When studying for an examination, 1 prepare a of probable questions and answers. list
__ 59. Most of my instructors lecture too fast.
__ 60. I do well on completion items.
__ 61. I have trouble seeing the difference between apparently similar ideas.
__ 62. I carefully complete all course assignments.
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